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Reterritorialising the policing of cybercrime in the post-COVID-19 era: Towards a 
vision of local democratic cybercrime policing 
 






Design:  This conceptual paper draws on empirical evidence from a range of sources 
(including official statistics) and the existing research literature, and revisits Routine Activities 
Theory in order to illuminate the way that cybercrime patterns are being transformed by the 
pandemic. 
 
Purpose: Our purpose is to develop the theorisation of cybercrime in the context of the 
pandemic, and to sketch out a vision of how law enforcement might respond to a 
transformed landscape of online crime and offending. 
 
Findings: The pandemic is reshaping the routine activities of societies en masse, leading to 
changes in the ecology of risk and opportunity for cybercrime. There is evidence of a 
significant increase in the prevalence of cybercrime as a result, yet much of this has a 
paradoxically 'local' character. 
 
Implications: We identify specific practical implications for law enforcement, namely that the 
role of local police in policing cybercrime should be re-envisioned, with a democratic, 
community-oriented approach at its heart. 
 
Value: The theoretical perspective outlined is a novel and critical development of a well-
established framework, opening up new paths to the theorisation of cybercrime and 
cybercrime policing. Our suggestions for practitioners have the potential for direct impact, 





Crime, harm, and how societies police them are influenced by the cultural, economic and 
material factors present at particular points in history. In this article, we argue that modern 
societies have arrived at a transformative moment in which decades-long patterns of change 
are coming to fruition with important implications for cybercrime scholarship. Although this 
will undoubtedly become a trite observation, the emergence of a novel coronavirus in late 
2019, and the subsequent global pandemic have caused transformative change to global 
societies and state institutions, with a rapidity unprecedented in modern history. As a result 
of these mass-scale social transformations, the coronavirus pandemic has been 
accompanied by a reshaping of the landscape of cybercrime and its place in broader 
patterns of harm and victimisation, and it is on this which we focus here. In order to make 
sense of these changes, we develop the argument, previously set out in Collier et al. (2020), 
that renewed approaches to theorising cybercrime are required in the context of the 
pandemic as it reveals many of the assumptions around the phenomenon of cybercrime and 
how it is policed do not necessarily hold true. The aims of this article are twofold: first, we 
explore, through an expanded approach to the criminological theorisation of online harms, 
how cybercrime is changing in the time of coronavirus. Secondly, building on this novel 
theoretical and empirical perspective, we propose a renewed role for local, democratic 
policing in the management of cybercrime.  
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We begin by considering how cybercrime is generally theorised in the criminological 
literature, discussing the oft-employed Routine Activities Theory (RAT) approach and the 
shortcomings of a too-narrow focus on the ‘chemistry of crime’ element. Tacking back to the 
Chicago School roots of RAT, we argue that a broader focus on the social ecology of crime 
has the potential to open up a renewed analytical perspective on cybercrime which is crucial 
in making sense of how cybercrime is changing in the pandemic. We then set out some of 
the emerging empirical evidence as to how the COVID-19 pandemic and government 
initiatives in response are creating novel cybercrime risks and opportunities for cybercrime 
markets. In the following section, we describe in broader terms how the pandemic is 
reshaping the routines of everyday life, and what this might mean for cybercrime 
victimisation, arguing that many of the issues that are emerging are of a particularly ‘local’ 
character. We then set out in detail our argument for a localised vision of cyber policing, 
showing how the unique strengths of local police forces might be well-positioned to address 
various aspects of the current model which may come under strain as a result of the 
pandemic, and drawing on the literature on democratic policing to identify the key principles 
that should inform this new capability. We conclude with some reflections as to the 
implications of our analysis for policymakers, practitioners, and the future of cybercrime 
scholarship. 
 
2. Routine Activities Theory revisited 
 
Cybercrime research has taken a particular interest in Routine Activities Theory (RAT) 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979), which it has employed to explain the presence or absence of 
crime online, drawing attention in particular to the convergence of motivated offender and 
suitable victim or target, and to how the anonymising and concealed nature of the Internet 
may generate frequent absences of ‘capable guardianship’. This transformation of crime’s 
relationship with space with the advent of the Internet has driven a large body of research 
which has applied this perspective (Wall, 2007), often from a microsociological perspective 
focusing on the interactions in time and space that do or do not present an ‘opportunity’ for 
an offender to commit crime; as such, these analyses bear theoretical similarities with 
perspectives associated with rational choice theory, situational crime prevention, and crime 
science. 
 
The aim of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) original article was to examine how deep structural 
changes in the spatial and temporal rhythms of the social fabric might account for changes in 
crime patterns, arguing that it was precisely such structural changes to society that had 
inadvertently produced the post-War increases in crime rates experienced in the United 
States.  
 
In early work using the RAT framework, Cohen and Felson (1979) focused their attention on 
increases in affluence and various social transformations such as the movement of women 
into workplaces following the Second World War. These macro-social changes in the social 
structure were translated into a micro-level analytic framework, which proposed that when 
three particular factors - a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a 
capable guardian - converged in time and space, crime could occur. Cohen and Felson 
(1979) argued that the observed changes increased the number of homes without ‘capable 
guardians’ for longer periods of time which increased the possibility of a willing offender 
exploiting that ‘vulnerable target’. The focus on materiality which this engenders, namely, the 
material and spatial components of targets (traditionally the weight and portability of 
consumer goods), the co-presence of victim and offender, and the ability of guardians to 
intervene in these processes, has generally made it a readily usable framework for making 
sense of cybercrime. 
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It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a comprehensive review of RAT and 
cybercrime - for a more detailed review, see Reyns2018), however some key points are 
necessarily addressed below. In initial criminological forays into theorising cybercrime, one 
of the core debates animating this emerging field was around whether cybercrime 
constituted a distinctively ‘novel’ form of crime. There was a particular focus in these debates 
on the spatiality of the Internet and how this might transform crime and victimisation. By 
taking the various technological and infrastructural aspects of the Internet and rendering 
these as fundamental changes in social topology, RAT(which inherently conceives of crime 
through relations of space, time, and human behaviour) constituted a useful and 
reconciliatory way of making sense of online victimisation (Yar, 2005). In the criminological 
and sociological study of  cybercrime, applications of RAT have focused on how the Internet 
maps on to these material-spatial arrangements; in particular how its ‘hidden’ and 
‘unregulated’ qualities may frustrate capable guardianship. Ultimately, when criminologists 
have used RAT to make sense of the spatiality of the Internet, this has replicated the 
depictions of a global society with which the Internet was associated during its early years of 
commercialisation. arguing that it has exploded geographies of space into a hyperspatial 
online realm in which people from around the world are interconnected (Yar 2005; McGuire, 
2007).  Therefore RAT offers a straightforward way of thinking through the implications of the 
integration of the Internet into our everyday lives for crime and criminal justice - and as we 
argue here - for the social changes wrought by COVID-19, international lockdowns, and 
social distancing. 
 
Applications of RAT that over-emphasise the situational causes of crime also effectively 
suggest straightforward and readily implementable crime prevention strategies. RAT has 
been applied to different forms of online offending and victimisation with varying degrees of 
profitability ( see Reyns, 2018). Preoccupation with micro-level changes in human 
interactivity, connectivity, and what this means for ‘criminal opportunity’ has led to a focus 
predominantly on situational crime prevention perspectives associated with Newman and 
Clarke (2003). Until recently (see Maimon et al., 2019), this has arguably led to cybercrime 
research overlooking social perspectives on cybercrime prevention (Crawford, 2007), and 
how tertiary concepts such as ‘collective efficacy’, ‘social capital’, and community oriented 
models of policing might be re-envisaged and redeployed in this context. In the context of 
the pandemic, when the established times and spaces of the social are fundamentally 
challenged and reorganised, RAT provides a useful tool for the analysis of the increasingly 
fluid and dynamic micro and macro level implications of such a rapid exercises in social 
reorganisation that we are witnessing as the pandemic progresses. 
 
Beyond the investigation of specific changes to routine activities, there has been some 
broader application of RAT to understanding the macro changes in crime with which the 
Internet is associated, casting it as a new and detached space in which crime may be 
committed. The base assumptions on which the criminological cybercrime canon has 
emerged are the same features on which earlier criminological accounts of the phenomenon 
expended so much ink; the features that separate it from terrestrial forms of crime. 
Cybercrime is, in this account, globalised in nature and ‘despatialised’ - unbounded by time 
or space, by city or sovereign spaces, and upends how the ‘the crime problem’ has been 
understood and tackled by nation states (for archetypal accounts see Yar and Steinmetz, 
2019; Wall, 2007). The explosion of online offences in the past 20 years, along with 
prevalence of various forms of cybercrime victimisation among certain populations could 
thus be explained drawing on this perspective, where the Internet has facilitated globalised 
hyperconnectivity of vulnerable victims, willing offenders, and the absence of capable online 
guardians (Reyns, 2018; Williams, 2016; Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016;  Holt and Bossler, 2008). 
 
This characterisation of the Internet as a space unbounded in territory and time has tended 
to draw cybercrime scholarship towards a focus on the ‘deterritorialisation’ (Behr, 2008) of 
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crime problems and policing responses. In adopting this approach, analyses sought to avoid 
the limitations of criminological theory rooted in local or national boundaries, and highlighted 
its global nature and the challenges posed to sovereign criminal justice apparatus. By 
casting cybercrime problems as inherently international, unbounded by territory or 
jurisdiction, this ‘deterritorialised’ conceptualisation has generally also been useful for 
understanding the forms of cybercrime policing which subsequently have been developed in 
response. Cybercrime policing is indeed dominated by international relationships and 
networks, chiefly between centralised agencies such as the FBI (in the US) and NCA (in the 
UK); international co-operative organisations such as Interpol and Europol; and private 
sector providers. This has meant that the cybercrime response from law enforcement has 
been spearheaded by a mixture of ‘high policing’ and intelligence-led models focusing on 
‘serious cybercrime’ in the hierarchy of standing (Yar, 2013), which have been leveraged for 
resourcing priority and symbolic prominence (Brodeur, 2010). Where ‘low policing’ has 
featured in academic and practitioner discussions, it mostly appears to be constructed in 
terms of its supportive capacity to the high policing agenda and investigative ends, generally 
in an intelligence-gathering role. In the UK this can be seen in the expansion of PREVENT-
style policing to young ‘at risk’ online offenders (as, for example, in the NCA’s ‘Cyber 
choices’ campaign). 
 
Constructing the Internet, as this micro-situational approach generally does (Leukfeldt and 
Yar, 2016), as a place where guardianship is frustrated or impossible ignores the pervasive 
private sector cybersecurity industry, the power that Internet Service Providers have to 
screen and censor content, the vast surveillance capabilities of the security services, and the 
increasingly crucial role of platforms, such as Facebook and Google, in governing content 
and behaviour online. Many of these entities, institutions, and organisations have capacities 
of guardianship and control which would be inconceivable in pre-Internet societies, often in 
forms which take explicit account of local laws, jurisdictions, and cultural contexts. 
 
Framing online crime as spatio-temporally unbounded also elides important aspects of the 
technical geography of the Internet and its control. Internet geography is far from the ‘flat’ 
space envisioned in early discussions of online space, and the material infrastructure of the 
Internet is often distributed in ways which are paradoxically local, as discussed in section 5 
below. The influence of law and its enforcement, and the knock-on effect on hosting 
infrastructure, means that particular illicit services, whether they be for copyrighted material, 
illicit markets, or hosting tend to concentrate in jurisdictions where this content is not illegal 
or where the law is not enforced (Clayton, Moore, and Christin, 2015). In addition to this 
technical and legal geography, cybercrime and online harm are rooted in a local geography 
of cultures, practices, and concerns, and are as bound up in local communities as they are 
international ones. This is increasingly recognised by major Internet platforms, the de-facto 
capable guardians into whose hands much governance of online conduct falls, for example: 
issues at local and national level, such as the use of WhatsApp in India for casteist violence, 
the effects of disinformation on the US election, or the enforcement of strict German laws 
around the promotion of far-right ideology. 
 
Consequently, , in focusing on the micro-level ‘chemistry’ of criminal opportunity, 
criminological analyses that draw on RAT have neglected to embrace the perspective’s 
capacity to take into account wider impacts of macro-level social change, and their 
concomitant changes in social geography, like those originally identified by Cohen and 
Felson (1979). Although this micro-level focus in contemporary cybercrime scholarship 
elides the broader cultural, economic, and other macrosocial factors which attend crime, 
these shortcomings are not necessarily inherent to the broader theoretical framework. There 
is much worth salvaging in RAT, as its lens on the spatiotemporal determinants of crime is 
potentially particularly useful for making sense of the changes wrought by COVID-19, many 
of which directly affect peoples’ daily routines. We argue that the sweeping changes our 
societies are facing are manifestly not only spatiotemporal, but also political, economic, and 
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cultural, much as the changes described by Cohen and Felson (1979) following the Second 
World War were. As is implicit in early RAT scholarship, the territories within which these 
micro-situations are composed are in fact themselves socially and historically 
contingent. Taking RAT back to these theoretical roots and connecting it up to these social 






The roots of RAT as a theory of social ecology (in the mode of the Chicago School from 
which it emerged) including societal change, we contend, may therefore be more productive 
for developing more well-rounded understandings of cybercrime and online harm, especially 
in the context of mass-scale social changes such as those brought about or accelerated by 
the current pandemic. Societal responses to Covid-19 have accelerated already-ongoing 
changes to routine activities facilitated by information technology, and arguably, by returning 
to the original macro-level analytic approach of Cohen and Felson (1979), we can better 
understand these shifts in the context of longer-term social changes. It would appear r that 
‘lockdowns’, physical distancing and other public health measures transform criminal and 
victimisation opportunity structures at the macro scale, decreasing the prevalence of some 
opportunities (e.g. domestic burglary), and increasing others (e.g. domestic violence, fraud, 
and cyber-dependent crime). These also reshape aspects of culture and social psychology 
in ways which are pertinent to understanding the changing nature of online harms. 
 
We explore this further below and argue that this provides a productive way of making sense 
of how COVID is changing cybercrime, and help us reimagine the role of public policing. In 
doing so, we move beyond merely situational-level responses (which tend to reduce to 
measures such as target hardening and surveillance) towards approaches rooted in 
communities and social institutions, suggesting instead a more nuanced criminological and 
psychological understanding of cybercrime. In the following section, we consider some of the 
specific transformations prompted by the ongoing pandemic. 
 
3. COVID and cybercrime: emerging evidence 
 
Although it is undoubtedly far too early to pinpoint the lasting effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the government responses it has prompted, at the time of writing a series of 
evidence sources have emerged which are suggestive of possible trends. The social, 
economic, and political consequences of lockdown, social distancing, and mass illness are 
becoming clearer, and evidence now suggests some large-scale transformation, at least in 
the short term, in patterns of crime. Below, we discuss some of the emerging evidence of 
how cybercrime appears to be changing as the pandemic progresses, drawing from a range 
of sources focused on the UK and the US by way of illustrating our wider theoretical 
argument. We begin by drawing evidence from official recorded crime figures, which indicate 
a transformation in crime patterns, then discuss in detail some of the broader indications we 
observe. In the subsequent section we discuss in broader, more theoretical terms, what this 
may mean for cybercrime in the long term.  
 
Official government data on cybercrime is sparse in the United Kingdom for well-established 
reasons (Levi et al., 2017; Yar and Steinmetz, 2020), but sources are gradually improving. 
An increasing number of surveys (e.g. the Cyber Security Breaches Survey, conducted by 
Ipsos MORI for the UK Government), as well as the incorporation of cyber ‘indicators’ into 
victimisation surveys and police recorded crime have allowed for the development of a 
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clearer picture of cybercrime trends, particularly in the context of COVID (Buil-Gil et al., 
2020). 
 
Official recorded crime statistics in Scotland show emerging trends that are potentially 
indicative of a major transformation in crime. In April 2020, there were 18% fewer offences 
reported to the police than April 2019. This was driven by large reductions in offences with a 
characteristic ‘physical’ component, with violent crime decreasing by 14%, sexual crime 
decreasing by 26%, shoplifting decreasing by nearly half, and a 29% reduction in ‘other theft’ 
(Scottish Government, 2020a). However, for fraud (a criminal offence category under which 
much volume cybercrime falls) there was a 38% increase on the previous year. The 
following month (May 2020), saw a reduction of only 5% in criminal offences reported to the 
police on the previous year, with violent and sexual crimes remaining down on 2019, but a 
72% increase in fraud, and a 52% increase in ‘other crimes’, largely driven by drug 
possession offences and crimes against public justice, such as bail offences (Scottish 
Government, 2020b). Although the picture is still emerging, it is not surprising that this data 
suggests that lockdown in Scotland has had substantial effects on the geographies and 
patterns of crime. This is mirrored in England and Wales, with an ONS report showing a 23% 
year-on-year increase in reported cybercrime, including a 55% increase in ‘hacking - social 
media and email’ offences and a 61% increase in ‘computer virus/malware’ offences 
(Muncaster, 2020). Further evidence regarding the rise of cybercrime has been reported by 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (Belfast Telegraph, 2020), and the Scottish 
Government Cyber Resilience Unit (2020).  
 
Turning to empirical data collection beyond official statistics, we find from the Cambridge 
Cybercrime Centre’s (CCC) analysis of their cybercrime datasets that the social changes 
and government policies which have emerged as a result of COVID-19 appear to have been 
exploited by  the low-level cybercrime economy. Early analyses suggest this was a result of 
many users (including adolescents and young adults) being confined to home with no school 
or work for much of the day. Increased boredom may well be a key driver of online petty 
crime (Collier, 2020a; Maimon and Howell, 2020). Anxiety over job losses and business 
closures may prompt some to become involved in or to increase existing illicit online activity 
as a means of income generation. The CCC has observed significant increases in trading in 
some ancillary cybercrime markets, such as Paypal and Bitcoin exchanges on cybercrime 
forums (Vu et al., 2020), in Denial of Service attack services (Clayton, 2020), as well as 
across a range of illicit products, such as stolen accounts. This increase was also observed 
in online far-right forums (Vu, 2020). This influx of additional money and activity does not 
appear to represent a transformation of online illicit services, volume crime or cybercrime-as-
a-service markets, but rather is a general stimulus to these markets arising from changes to 
everyday life brought about by lockdown. 
 
There are also indications of increased opportunities for fraud. Many online frauds reported 
appear to rely on classic ‘social engineering’ and deception to elicit a response from victims 
(Hadnagy, 2010). These techniques are made more salient by social conditions induced by 
the pandemic. The pandemic has generated a heightened sense of fear and uncertainty, 
further exacerbated by lockdowns: many people are isolated, separated from friends and 
extended family, and/or facing lockdown alone. Many will be spending an extended period of 
time online, working from home, or perhaps engaging with the 24-hour news cycle. Among 
the fraudulent activities  reported is a rise in fake online shop fronts claiming to sell masks, 
tests, or treatments for COVID, and there is evidence that those who commit cybercrime 
have adapted the language of their scams rapidly in response to government initiatives. It 
has also been reported anecdotally that there has been an increase in bogus adverts for 
pets (including puppies and parrots) on local classified advertising platforms, exploiting 
people’s wish for companionship during extended periods of home-based life and social 
isolation. 
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Scams, spam, and phishing campaigns are being adapted, but there are limited indications 
that this amounts to a true increase in prevalence; rather, COVID-19 is currently being used 
because it is eye-catching. For many of the more directly-COVID related crime risks, 
reporting has often stemmed from FBI actions, and so it is important to note that increased 
prominence of these risks may be a result of greater law enforcement focus on these 
activities. Much of the public health response to COVID-19 relies on the clear and robust 
delivery of messages to the public, and the collection of evidence and statistics from 
individuals (for example, through contact tracing). This in turn relies on digital infrastructure: 
ranging from online advertisements, information on social media (10DowningStreet, 2020), 
and online policy announcements through the traditional press (GOV.UK, 2020), to contact 
detection apps, test and trace portals (NHS UK, 2020). These in themselves present 
opportunities for emerging cybercrime risks, either from misinformation, fraud, or direct 
attack. 
 
It would seem that at least in the short term, COVID-19 has been associated with a 
transformation, not of cybercrime, but of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, routine activities, 
specific risks, and cultural contexts which feed it. While agencies in the UK have recognised 
the potential for COVID-19 cybercrime threats, the wider societal changes emerging as a 
result of the virus and national suppression efforts may lead to more lasting changes in 
offending and victimisation. This may ultimately require changes to policing practice. In the 
next section, we examine how COVID-19 has already changed routine activities, before 
considering how local policing might be adapted. 
 
4. Routine activities in (and following) a pandemic: a generational shift in 
patterns of crime 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the construction of new patterns (maybe even a ‘new 
normal’) of everyday life and has greatly accelerated a range of wider social and economic 
transformations that were previously under way such as remote working. In the context of 
policing, new technologies have been adopted quickly to support the enforcement of new 
powers and the reshaping of older practices to follow government guidance (see Wells et al., 
2020). There has only been limited time in which to critically assess the wider practical, 
security and ethical dimensions of that adoption. Police have necessarily adapted their ‘order 
maintenance’ practices as best they can (Reiner, 2010), but they face a fundamental 
challenge. In this section, we first discuss the short-term effects of strict lockdowns, 
increased mortality rates, and social panic in the context of the ‘first wave’ of the virus, and 
how this may inform our understanding of the early changes to crime which we observe. This 
may also prove useful in the (not unlikely) event of subsequent waves of this or future 
viruses. We then look more broadly to what may be the lasting effects of the current 
pandemic on cybercrime. 
 
The short-term effects of strict lockdowns across much of the world in of the first half of 2020 
have been profound. Considering these effects in terms of social ecology and criminal 
opportunity, we identify a range of ways in which these are driving opportunities for online 
harm. First, the experience of ‘lockdown’ prompted a major shift in the social organisation of 
everyday economic life. Since the closing of non-essential shops, consumers are engaging 
in more online shopping and businesses and organisations are developing their online 
presence and capabilities. Some businesses have already declared bankruptcy and others 
are likely to follow. Organisations have been forced to move online rapidly and adapt to 
remote and home-based working where possible. Through the lens of ‘routine activities’ this 
has significant consequences. In physical and geographical terms, for many the home is 
now occupied for most of the day while many shopfronts, factories and commercial sites 
have been unoccupied or experienced reduced occupancy. However, at the same time 
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(under lockdown conditions), many potential offenders are also confined at home. The 
prevalence, location, and form that property crime takes is thereby being changed. Equally, 
the night-time economy (itself associated with substantial amounts of crime and harm) 
effectively ceased to operate for much of March to July 2020. 
 
Moreover, remote working, online shopping, online entertainment services, online payments, 
and data processing are being embraced in new ways and at far greater volumes 
(Brauenstein, 2020), as more and more businesses, workers, and consumers innovate to 
respond to home-based life and social distancing. The speed with which these technologies 
have been adopted has not always allowed for the adequate development and provision of 
cyber security practices or cyber-incident response plans, protocols or training, and potential 
disruption to home Internet connections (as through Denial of Service attacks, which can be 
purchased at low cost through ‘booter’ services) now poses a potentially serious risk to 
people’s working lives. The New York Times has reported rapid increases in the number and 
volume of online payments processed, and large retailers are reporting increases in online 
sales (New York Times, 2020). Shifts to online shopping have also been innovating at more 
local levels as small and medium local enterprises seek a sustainable model for an uncertain 
future. The situation is further compounded by the necessary downloading and use of 
software with which individuals and employees may be unfamiliar, and on machines that are 
not centrally administered. This may have knock-on effects on software updating practices 
(see Vaniea and Rashidi, 2016), the secure storage of personal data, the use of firewalls, 
and compliance with data protection regulations. Together this rapid and vast techno-social 
change in everyday life inevitably increases opportunities for or and vulnerabilities to online 
offending. 
 
These changes also affect the daily lives of those involved in committing cybercrime in a 
range of ways. During periods of lockdown, many adolescents and young people are 
spending an increased amount of their educational, social, and leisure time online. Even 
when education and work have resumed, for many, this is unlikely fully to resemble or reflect 
co-present experience prior to the pandemic. Increased boredom and personal ‘strain’ which 
this has caused may be exacerbating the ‘push’ factors towards involvement in cybercrime 
and other forms of harmful or illegal online behaviour (Collier, 2020a). Those already 
involved in cybercrime communities and forums have substantially more time to engage with 
these activities, while those experiencing unemployment and economic strain may increase 
their participation in online illicit markets in order to supplement their income. There is 
evident potential for an increased number of ‘willing offenders’ who have access to a greater 
number of particularly vulnerable individuals and businesses.  
 
Our social lives have also rapidly moved online. As people spend more time on social 
networks and new communication platforms such as Zoom, they are exposed to a wider 
variety of threats and more often. As platforms become more popular, new threats are likely 
to emerge (e.g. ‘Zoom bombing’). These changes are particularly visible in the rise of virtual 
classrooms, restricting the social activities of children and young people. This will potentially 
have significant implications for children and younger Internet users’ exposure to cyber-
bullying or child sexual exploitation (Interpol, 2020). Equally, parents may be restricted in 
their ability to exercise oversight, and may be less well connected with organic informal 
social networks of support and advice (see Rader and Wash, 2015). 
Even as lockdowns ease, it is reasonable to suspect that certain far-reaching social-
organisational and economic changes, for example to working patterns and online shopping, 
are likely to persist well into the future. It would be premature to suggest that we have 
reached a stable ‘new normal’; as weeks pass and guidelines shift variably across societies, 
our ‘new normal’ is continuously being redefined and renegotiated to the extent that any 
conceptualisation of ‘social order’ is necessarily tentative. A number of changes can, 
however, be observed in our current context that will have implications for people’s exposure 
to online risk, and as a result, demand for policing. Our central aim at this point is to begin 
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building an argument that peers beyond ‘policing during a pandemic’ in order to consider the 
longer-term and deeper social change the pandemic could usher in, the changes in crime 
patterns we might expect, and the implications of those changes for ‘post-pandemic 
policing’. 
 
Crucially, the early indicators suggest an increasingly local dimension to many of the forms 
of online crime which are on the rise: bullying and harassment, grooming and stalking, fraud, 
and other forms of victimisation that, despite their digital dimension have distinctly local 
characteristics, often either involving people living within the same communities and 
jurisdictions, or interacting with local risks, concerns, and challenges. 
 
5. Local policing of cybercrime: ‘reterritorialising’ online crime 
 
The current moment appears to be one of interregnum and transition to a period in which 
people’s everyday lives and their experiences of crime and harm may look rather different. 
This raises questions about how societies currently deal with cybercrime, and whether it may 
be constructive to re-examine its local dimensions.  
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we explore how the Internet, while global in scope, 
necessarily remains locally grounded. Second, we argue that while it is vital to recognise 
cybercrime’s international dimensions, there are various ways cybercrime may be rooted in a 
given locale, and which may be particularly apparent in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Third, we demonstrate how certain core activities of cybercrime units within 
regional police forces already contain local elements, and argue for building further on this 
capacity and expanding the role of local police in the policing of cybercrime, including in 
relation to its prevention, detection and investigation. Last, we reflect on the ways local 
police are already well-placed to build on their existing community-oriented work to tackle 
cybercrime, and point to some of the challenges that a step-change in and significant 
upscaling of capacity are likely to present. 
 
The geography of policing (in general) cannot easily be conceptualised simply through a 
‘local’ versus ‘global’ opposition, and includes important distinctions between international, 
national, regional and local policing issues (Bowling, 2009). However, in the context of 
cybercrime, we argue that it is analytically useful to counterpose two distinct sets of issues 
which cut across these geographies. The first of these are ‘globalised’ cybercrime policing 
issues, which address predominantly issues of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the mass-scale 
interconnection of people and services remotely around the world (for a more 
comprehensive review see Holt et al., 2015 ). These issues are fundamentally about the 
ways in which the Internet further complicates and challenges the sovereign geography of 
state power (Garland, 1996). These policing challenges have been well articulated 
elsewhere (see Yar and Steinmetz, 2019), and will only receive a brief mention here. At a 
national and international level, public policing and the conventional criminal justice 
apparatus is required to engage in increasingly complex public and private co-operation (see 
for example Levi and Williams., 2013). These efforts may be enabled or frustrated by 
international relations and the dynamics of geopolitical power (Cavelty, 2007). Additional 
issues are presented by private sector platforms and service providers whose position in the 
Internet’s social and technical infrastructure shape the existential security of the nation state 
and support or undermine its claim to sovereignty over its citizens (Brodeur, 2010; Collier, 
2020b). The second set of issues, in contrast, and which we foreground in this paper, are 
‘localised’ issues, in which the Internet’s interpenetration of local infrastructures, cities, 
towns, and communities connects individuals within local geographies in novel ways (for 
example Miller, 2015). In these regional and community policing contexts, social harms need 
to be understood with reference to specific knowledge about these local communities and 
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their needs, through partnerships in which issues of trust and legitimacy are crucial 
(Mackenzie and Henry, 2009). 
 
While the Internet enables the international flow of data between connected computing 
devices, it ultimately involves users and computers that are physically located in specific 
places. In order to deliver low-latency and localised services to users, the architecture of the 
Internet, and in particular the geographic location of network servers, may often be 
physically situated close to a certain region, cluster of users, or locale, meaning that 
‘gamers’ using an apparently international gaming service, for example, may in fact have 
their sessions hosted on a server alongside other local users. That is to say that people 
playing in Scotland, for instance, may be sorted into online games with other players in that 
and neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the architecture of the Internet shapes access to 
services. Wealthier countries and regions are able to invest more in infrastructure, and faster 
networks tend to be located in urban centres. The geography of the Internet has drawn 
significant research attention due to its uneven lines of distribution, access, and control 
(Graham, Ojanpera, and Dittus, 2019). As a result of a mixture of technical (e.g. low latency), 
legal/regulatory, and economic reasons, network servers and services may be situated 
relatively close to end users. Emerging paradigms such as ‘edge computing’ - a networking 
concept with the philosophy that “computing should happen as close as possible to the data 
source” (Shi et al., 2016) - appear set to amplify this process. The increased deployment of 
edge computing (for example in support of smart cities or Internet of Things (IoT) devices) 
means that users are increasingly likely to be served by closer computational resources. 
This ultimately places our online lives increasingly proximate to our physical location.  
 
Cybercrime may also exhibit ‘local’ qualities in a number of respects. The localisation of 
network servers and computing resources may generate scenarios in which both the 
cybercrime offender and victim, as well as key elements of the network, are all 
geographically proximate (Collier et al., 2019). Various forms of online harassment are likely 
to involve an offender already known to the victim, or who is a member of a particular known 
local community, even if the platform on which the offence takes place is provided by a 
global social media company. Intimate partner violence is a particularly important case of 
this form of crime with an increasingly ‘online’ dimension (Lopez-Neira et al., 2019). 
Regardless of the physical location of servers, certain forms of cybercrime may involve 
distinctively ‘local’ dimensions, as a result of shared (or disputed) politics, languages and 
culture. Even where the victim and offender are not local to one another, and where there is 
no obviously single ‘local’ dimension to the offence, offender and victim nevertheless both 
reside in a specific district in a specific country, and there is therefore scope for their 
respective local police forces to become involved. As we discuss further below, this scenario 
is in fact effectively the backbone of the policing of cybercrime to date, including in relation to 
Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM), computer ‘hacking’, and malware, among other types 
of cybercrime. 
 
We have argued thus far that the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the migration toward 
online services, modified computer users’ real-world and online routine activities, and 
introduced new cyber security vulnerabilities. As routine activities shift in the pandemic to 
bring forms of activity such as shopping and socialising more fully ‘online’, whilst some of 
this will abandon local locales in favour of the lower costs and larger communities afforded 
by national and international platforms, we may predict that other local retailers, services and 
communities will embrace and thrive online, and thus so too will the cybercrime risk 
landscape take on an increasingly local character. As the public become increasingly 
exposed to cybercrime risks in the context of the pandemic, clarity around the police role in 
responding to and preventing cybercrime is essential. The pandemic presents local police 
services with an opportunity to go beyond orthodox approaches to cybercrime prevention - 
and we argue that they are in fact particularly well-placed to do so. The role of public policing 
in responding to cybercrime is however currently relatively small in comparison with the 
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private and non-governmental sectors and with more centralised policing agencies such as 
the NCA (Wall, 2007). 
 
The present paucity of the local police role in responding to cybercrime is generally 
explained through the practical limitations imposed by the supposedly global and immaterial 
nature of online life (see Wall, 2007: 162-165), and/or the cultural construction of cybercrime 
and the police role. The scale of common forms of cyber-victimisation both in number of 
victims and geographical spread challenge geographically-bounded regional force 
capacities. Where individual harms are minor, and resources are stretched, questions are 
raised in local forces about whether it is in the public interest to devote resources to costly 
multi-national investigations.  . On the one hand, police occupational culture’s embedded 
notions of ‘danger’ and concern with ‘crime-fighting’ and ‘emergency response’ (Reiner 
2010, 1979; Skolnick 1966) mean that many common forms of cybercrime do not neatly fit 
into that role, despite evidence of perceived seriousness or claims of ownership of the crime 
problem (Bossler et al., 2015). On the other hand, low reporting levels contribute to a  limited 
police mandate to address cybercrime, and has been explained by the public's perception of 
common cybercrime as an individual problem which passes the threshold for police action in 
only a limited number of instances (HM Government, 2016; Yar, 2013). The police face 
additional problems of sufficient training (Reform, 2017; Cockcroft et al., 2018), and 
ultimately retaining trained officers where salaries struggle to compete with the offerings of 
the private sector (Harkin et al., 2018; Whelan and Harkin, 2019). While an increasing 
number of authors are exploring the new and innovative ways police are responding to a 
variety of cybercrime threats (Brewer et al., 2019; Dupont, 2016), we argue that at the level 
of local policing more attention has been paid to its limits than its capacities and possible 
futures.  
 
We are not suggesting that regional police forces can or should take on primary 
responsibility for ‘responding’ to volume cybercrime, nor alone pursue or duplicate costly and 
complex investigations amidst the pandemic. Instead, we propose that now is a key moment 
in which the public police can carve out and assert its role in the prevention and policing of 
cybercrime locally. For the current discussion, we separate this preventive role into two main 
strands, with one strand focused on victims, potential victims, and communities and the 
other focused on offenders. These should be understood as ‘ideal types’ for the purpose of 
argument and conceptual analysis, rather than a prescriptive reduction of the complexities of 
the public-police role.  
 
The first of these roles involves engagement with victims (and potential victims) of 
cybercrime including crimes such as fraud, online grooming and harassment. In a review of 
the evidence on cyber security awareness campaigns, Bada et al. (2015) argue that in order 
to be effective, cyber awareness messages and their communication need to resonate with 
their target populations. Who communicates messages and how these messages are 
conveyed will shape how the target audience interprets and operationalise their 
recommendations. Current provision within the UK, for example, is UK-wide in its orientation 
and pursues a ‘top-down’ strategy of effectiveness by simplicity and consistency. In 
approaching cyber resilience in this way however, the messages cannot account for diverse 
social and cultural contexts, which leave them vulnerable to misinterpretation (Horgan, 
2019). 
 
The second strand of this preventive role targets those who commit, or are at risk of 
committing, cybercrime and the online communication offences we discuss above. In this 
case, for criminal conduct which involves very large numbers of often low-level offenders, 
target hardening from security companies is largely unhelpful, and the investigative 
capacities of centralised LEAs are more suited to small numbers of individuals and groups 
involved in limited-scope, high-harm offending. However, police services are uniquely well-
placed to engage with these forms of crime due to their existing human infrastructure and 
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skills, deep ties to local communities, and knowledge of local issues. The police already deal 
with much interpersonal online crime through their regular duties, despite its ‘online’ 
dimension - however digital spaces are often perceived by the public (and sometimes the 
police) to be outside routine police-work. 
 
Of course, policing is no stranger to issues of centralisation and its implications for effective 
and accountable local policing - issues that have been debated in Scotland in recent years, 
for example (Henry, 2017; Jones, 2008). Arguably, it is in finding the balance between 
centralised and localised responses that policing might best advance (Henry, 2017). Thus 
far, discussions of cyber security and cybercrime prevention strategies have reflected the 
very global and inter-jurisdictional conditions which tend to underlie most approaches, 
however here we argue that issues of localism and local responsiveness are long overdue 
development and integration. If we are to proceed with a ‘responsibilisation strategy’ 
(Garland, 2001) geared towards population-level behaviour change, harnessing the specific 
knowledge and community networks that local policing has developed and is concerned with 
promoting is one way that central messages can be communicated to different groups in 
ways that are sensitive to and engage with their local social and cultural contexts. It is 
important to note that here we are making a distinction between community-level 
engagement with individuals deemed ‘at risk’ of offending captured by the work of the NCA, 
and the more discursive, problem-solving and participatory approaches to policing that help 
identify the specific challenges and needs present in local communities (Skogan, 2006).  
 
If a case is to be made for an increased role of local police in cybercrime policing, this also 
presents an opportune moment for consideration as to what would be the ideal 
characteristics of that role. At the heart of this re-envisioning of the police’s role is the 
incorporation into cybercrime policing of core ‘process-led’ community policing principles 
such as ‘citizen-involvement’, ‘problem solving’ and ‘decentralisation’ (Skogan, 2006) on the 
one hand, and core principles of ‘democratic policing’ on the other (Jones, 2008: 694-697), 
including ‘responsiveness’, ‘participation’, ‘information’, and ‘equity’. This approach serves to 
help construct cybercrime and cyber-resilience as local issues around which communities of 
support can be mobilised to enhance collective efficacy. By inviting community stakeholders 
to have conversations about cybercrime, they can become part of a dialogue in which they 
have an active stake, rather than simply being the subjects of top-down uni-directional 
awareness campaigns. Beyond addressing the weaknesses of ‘one-size-fits-all’ awareness 
campaigns through facilitating these kinds of conversations, local police services are in a 
better position to encourage reporting, challenge the stigma associated with victimisation 
(Button and Cross, 2017), and capture a more reliable picture of cybercrime victimisation 
within different communities. Arguably, local frontline police are in a unique position to 
undertake this work and reinforce cybercrime prevention in a way that extends beyond yet 
complements the remits of centralised agencies. 
 
Public police have already been developing community partnerships of this kind, particularly 
with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and third sector organisations. In Scotland, 
to establish a dialogue between businesses who may be the target of cybercrime, Police 
Scotland and the Scottish Business Resilience Centre (SBRC) developed a leaflet promoting 
cyber security (Scottish Business Resilience Centre, 2020). Other forces have taken a 
different approach to engage with the SME community. In partnership with the London 
Digital Security Centre (LDSC), uniformed police officers visit these businesses to build up a 
relationship, promoting who can be contacted in the event of cyber security issues (Bada 
and Nurse, 2019). Hampshire Constabulary worked in association with the University of 
Portsmouth to explore how to increase cyber resilience and cyber-awareness within the 
wider community (Karagiannopoulos et al., 2019). The work draws several conclusions, 
focussing on different dimensions of a community, e.g. young people, the elderly, the 
general public, and SMEs. This approach to engagement could be rolled out on a wider 
scale, complementing existing work carried out by local police. 
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It is important to emphasise that we are not arguing for the local police to simply extend the 
intelligence-gathering arm for high-policing functions, or to become a localised PREVENT-
style service. Rather, the principles of democratic and community-oriented policing point to a 
potential set of values to be embodied by ‘low’ cybercrime policing functions which might 
have particular purchase for addressing volume cybercrime victimisation as an issue. Here 
we propose that in constructing cybercrime as a local policing issue, we are inviting it to be 
subjected to the lens of democratic (Jones, 2008) and community-oriented models (Skogan, 
2008), of both police response and scrutiny.  
 
While community policing is a contested term both in philosophy and practice (Skogan, 
2006), the activities that fall under its rubric (and its concern with building working 
relationships and legitimacy) render it a desirable feature of the policing of cybercrime for a 
number of reasons. For analytical exposition we can take Skogan’s (2006) core principles as 
a starting point, namely that community policing is a process dedicated to citizen 
involvement, problem solving, and decentralisation. Contemporary centralised approaches to 
cybercrime policing (Scottish Government, 2018; HM Government, 2016) certainly engage in 
‘problem-solving’ and ‘citizen involvement’. However, these engagements appear limited to 
private and public sector entities (SMEs and large businesses), with less attention paid to 
engaging communities (geographically or culturally local and proximate) in dialogue about 
their experience of cybercrime, and how they might be involved in the development of 
policing. Centralised forms of cybercrime policing are facilitated in the context of businesses 
through umbrella organisations and their capacity cascade information. Equally, it is 
acknowledged in government and policing strategies (Scottish Government, 2018; HM 
Government, 2016) that different public and private sector sub-sections have different 
policing needs, much like the varying needs of different communities. The Scottish 
Household Survey (2019) illustrates how engagement with ‘cybersecurity’ varies with age 
and socio-demographic status suggesting that a more target and community-oriented 
approach is needed. - . Without emphasising community involvement, policing risks merely 
becoming the enforcement of compliance, with communities subject to top-down policing 
interventions in which they have little active engagement or stake. We argue that the existing 
infrastructure of relationships and practices which make up community policing might 
usefully allow this kind of work and engagement. 
 
We acknowledge that community policing is not without its challenges. Community policing 
is founded on an assumption that sufficiently coherent and homogenous ‘communities’ that 
share or agree upon collective needs and priorities, and a community-oriented policing of 
cybercrime will need to build on existing community relationships to establish where policing 
cybercrime needs are present and distinctive. ‘Communities’ seldom manifest in such 
uncomplicated formations. As Henry (2017) points out in the context of traditional policing, 
‘engagement’ without ‘equity’ risks policing activity that reflects the loudest or most privileged 
voices, missing those who need support. In conventional modes of policing, engagement 
efforts may be further frustrated by difficulty in reaching certain groups who may not have 
capacity or desire to engage in dialogue with policing organisations. Arguably, in the context 
of cybercrime, this frustration may be a function of cultural constructions of police and 
cybercrime mentioned earlier; as emergency responders dealing with immediate danger. 
Conversely, it may be that by emphasising community engagement and dialogue about 
cybercrime policing needs, local police can rearticulate their role in a way that incorporates 
the local experience of cybercrime.  Despite these acknowledged challenges, we argue that 
re-envisioning cybercrime as a community policing issue is worthwhile. Local forces have the 
resources and connections to tailor interventions that are ‘responsive’ to local-community 
needs, can be explained to the public, and can be held accountable through democratic 
mechanisms (Jones, 2008; Henry, 2017; Brodeur, 2010). Engaging local communities in 
problem-solving dialogue focused on cybercrime is a task for which we would suggest 
conventional local police are ideally suited. This may resultantly create a democratic arena 
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for debate, empowering the public to challenge some of the assumptions around how 
cybercrime is currently policed at the local level. This may move the governance of 
cybersecurity from a primarily unidirectional, top down approach situated either in central 
government entities or under the stewardship of private Internet platforms, to a dialogical 
one which draws on the knowledge of both territorial police leadership and frontline officers, 
as well as the local communities themselves. While the digital dimension of local crime, and 
the local dimension of digital crime, already form a part of police duties, we argue that the 
pandemic has created a need for the mainstreaming of this ‘local digital policing’ as a core 
part of the frontline police role. 
6. Conclusions: The social ecology of cybercrime in an era of mass social 
change 
 
COVID-19 induced changes in routine everyday life are contributing to a wider 
transformation in cybercrime. We propose an alternative vision for the role of the public 
police in a society that is likely to experience an increase in the number of cybercrime 
victims and offenders that fall within its terrestrial borders. The literature on policing 
cybercrime has consistently reproduced an account of this role that has become a somewhat 
unchallenged orthodoxy; public police capacity to address cybercrime is limited by its global 
nature, the geographical limits of police jurisdictions, the complications and costliness of 
transnational investigations, constraints on resources, and the values embedded in ‘police 
culture’ about ‘real police-work’ (Yar and Steinmetz, 2019; Boes and Leukfeldt; 2016; Yar, 
2013; Wall, 2007). These arguments have been further buttressed by the persistent 
underlying construction of cybercrime policing and cyber security as a private problem with 
privatised solutions, the provision of which has been predominantly left to the free market 
(Yar, 2008). 
 
Due to ongoing societal changes that have been accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, it 
is critical that we re-evaluate this position. We make the case that by reconstructing 
cybercrime and cybercrime prevention as a local public policing issue, the public police can 
reassert their role in policing cybercrime in a way that addresses inherent weaknesses in 
centralised approaches. By virtue of territorial forces’ local policing infrastructure and their 
guiding principles (Police Scotland, 2020), their community and front-line officers are in a 
unique position to carve out this role. This ultimately complements more centralised efforts in 
a way that is responsive to the local needs of different communities in a way that the private 
sector and national ‘high-policing’ agencies may not always be able to do. 
 
This is an ideal moment for local police forces to reexamine how they will pursue cybercrime 
policing in a way that is sustainable and reflects the monumental social and economic 
changes we have witnessed in recent months (but which are likely to stay with us). There 
are clear cybercrime threats and risks directly linked to COVID-19 which will benefit from 
police engagement with specialist agencies, including at the national or even international 
level, which have the capacity for advanced digital forensics and targeted cybercrime 
operations. However, as local policing is structured around local policing teams, we believe 
there is significant opportunity for the local policing of cybercrime similar to upscale or 
broaden the role of these teams to engage communities, businesses, organisations and 
stakeholders, inlduing  children, young people, and vulnerable adults, in conversations about 
cybercrime, their specific needs and challenges. Much of this is work in which frontline police 
are already engaged; however, we suggest that cybercrime problems be incorporated as a 
core part of this frontline role. 
 
In doing so, a democratic approach to the local policing of cybercrime and online harm may 
promote greater participation, enhance responsiveness, and contribute to an equity of 
service for individuals that is unrealistic via a centralised approach (or via private Internet 
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companies and platforms). This would allow local policing to capitalise on the existing 
relationships and insights long-developed in specific localities, link up awareness messaging 
with its target audience(s) in more direct ways, and enhance the legitimacy of both the 
messages and the public police as cybercrime responders. By enhancing the efficiency and 
responsive targeting of resources through the collection of frontline community intelligence 
and measurement of outcomes and local capacities, both police and researchers can better 
evaluate these approaches on an ongoing basis. In the interim, we argue that territorial 
police forces should review their cybercrime policing and prevention practices and 
capabilities to assess their current adequacy and resilience. 
 
We have approached an ideal moment in which to consider revising the public policing of 
cybercrime. Too much attention has been focused on the limits of the public police capacity, 
and not enough attention paid to its strengths or potential to play a unique and 
complementary role in tackling cybercrime. Arguably, the skills and capacities of local police 
will be crucial in responding to cybercrime and promoting equitable access to greater cyber 
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